Ninth Circuit Delivers Major ADA Victory for Incarcerated People with Disabilities
Adom v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation reinforces a fundamental principle: access that subjects a disabled person to pain, humiliation, and indignity may not be meaningful access at all.
On September 8, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an important published decision concerning the rights of incarcerated people with disabilities.
In Adom v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. 24-4756, a divided Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment against an incarcerated wheelchair user who alleged that California prison officials denied him necessary incontinence supplies for nearly five months.
The decision is significant far beyond the particular accommodation involved in the case.
At its core, Adom addresses a recurring problem faced by incarcerated people with disabilities: prison officials treating a request for a disability accommodation solely as a question of medical treatment or medical necessity.
The Ninth Circuit made clear that those are not necessarily the same question.
As Judge Richard A. Paez wrote for the majority:
“[A] public entity is not excused from its obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation solely because it determined the accommodation is not medically necessary or indicated.”
That distinction could have important consequences for disability-rights litigation throughout the Ninth Circuit.
Nearly Five Months Without Incontinence Supplies
Bilal Adom is a 57-year-old incarcerated man at Salinas Valley State Prison who uses a wheelchair, suffers from severe spinal pain, and experiences urinary and fecal incontinence.
CDCR had previously provided him with 14 adult diapers each week. In May 2021, the prison system entered a permanent order for the supplies.
But after Adom was transferred from one prison yard to another, that accommodation abruptly disappeared.
He received his final supply on September 1, 2021.
Regular distribution did not resume until January 20, 2022.
For months, Adom repeatedly told prison medical and custodial personnel what was happening.
According to the court's opinion, he explained that without the supplies he had “no alternative but to soil myself.” He reported soiling his bed, clothing, and wheelchair. At one point, he resorted to constructing makeshift diapers from torn towels, tissues, trash bags, and plastic.
He described the experience in two words:
“Humiliated and dehumanized.”
Yet his requests continued to be denied.
Instead of restoring the accommodation, officials offered alternatives such as additional towels, boxers, showers after incontinence episodes when security permitted, and laundry services.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a jury could find those responses inadequate.
The ADA Requires Meaningful Access—not Theoretical Access
One of the most important parts of Adom concerns what “access” actually means under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
CDCR argued that Adom still had access to toilets, showers, and laundry facilities. He had also been provided a commode, priority shower and laundry access, and additional towels and underwear.
But the Ninth Circuit recognized the practical reality of disability.
A toilet may technically be available.
A shower may technically exist.
Laundry services may technically be offered.
None of that necessarily means a disabled person can actually use those services in a meaningful way.
The majority put the principle plainly:
“When a person with a disability can access a public entity’s services only by experiencing pain and humiliation, that access is likely not meaningful.”
That sentence deserves attention.
The ADA is not satisfied merely because a facility or service exists somewhere inside an institution. The question is whether the disabled person can meaningfully access and use it considering the limitations created by the disability.
For Adom, involuntary urination could occur without warning—including during the middle of the night. His physical disabilities also made cleaning himself and his surroundings difficult and painful.
Simply telling him that showers, laundry, or toilets existed did not necessarily solve the problem.
As the court explained:
“CDCR treated Adom the same as nondisabled inmates when the ADA required CDCR to treat him differently.”
That is one of the central concepts behind disability law.
Equal treatment does not always mean identical treatment.
Sometimes equality requires accommodation.
A Medical Answer Does Not Resolve an ADA Question
Perhaps the most consequential part of the opinion is the Ninth Circuit's distinction between medical treatment and disability accommodation.
The district court had characterized Adom's dispute largely as a disagreement concerning medical treatment. CDCR similarly argued that its medical personnel had determined that adult diapers were not medically necessary.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that this ended the ADA inquiry.
Judge Paez summarized the problem with CDCR's position:
“This reasoning, however, gives a medical answer to an ADA question.”
That is an important distinction.
Adom was not claiming that diapers would cure his incontinence.
He was seeking them so that he could manage the consequences of his disability and maintain access to hygiene and toileting services with dignity.
An accommodation can therefore serve a fundamentally different purpose from medical treatment.
A wheelchair does not necessarily cure the condition preventing someone from walking.
A grab bar does not cure a mobility impairment.
An accessible shower does not cure paralysis.
And an incontinence product does not have to cure incontinence to potentially constitute a reasonable accommodation.
The ADA asks whether an accommodation is necessary to provide meaningful access—not simply whether a medical professional considers that accommodation medically necessary as treatment.
“Half-Solutions” May Not Be Enough
The decision is also important because the Ninth Circuit allowed Adom's claim for monetary damages to proceed toward a jury.
To recover damages under Title II, Adom must establish deliberate indifference.
The record contained evidence that prison officials knew about his disability-related needs. He repeatedly informed staff of the problem, filed grievances and accommodation requests, described the hygiene consequences he was experiencing, and explained the makeshift materials he was using.
The accommodation had also previously been approved.
Nevertheless, it was terminated after his transfer without a medical professional first examining him or asking him about his incontinence, according to the majority.
Even after a physician later said the supplies would be reinstated, another three weeks passed before Adom received them.
The Ninth Circuit concluded:
“A rational jury could find that CDCR acted with deliberate indifference when it provided Adom with half-solutions rather than granting him the accommodation he requested and that he had previously been provided.”
The phrase “half-solutions” may prove particularly useful in future disability cases.
Correctional institutions frequently respond to accommodation requests by pointing to something they provided rather than asking whether what they provided actually accommodated the disability.
Adom reinforces that the inquiry cannot necessarily end there.
The relevant question is whether the response actually provided meaningful access.
Notice Matters
The deliberate-indifference analysis also highlights the importance of documentation.
Adom repeatedly put officials on notice.
He submitted grievances.
He filed a reasonable accommodation request.
He described his incontinence.
He explained that he was soiling himself.
He identified the physical and psychological consequences.
He told officials that he was constructing makeshift diapers.
And he continued requesting assistance after his accommodation was denied.
Those facts mattered.
For incarcerated people pursuing disability claims, Adom provides another reminder of why documenting accommodation requests can be critical.
Written requests can establish not merely that an accommodation was sought, but that officials had actual notice of the disability-related barrier and the consequences of failing to address it.
Prison Officials Cannot Hide Behind Bureaucracy
Another important feature of Adom is what happened after Adom changed housing locations.
He already had an accommodation.
The supplies had been provided without incident.
Then he transferred yards and the order was terminated.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that CDCR failed to adequately investigate his circumstances before eliminating the accommodation.
That has implications beyond incontinence supplies.
People with disabilities are routinely transferred between cells, housing units, prisons, medical facilities, and institutions. Their disabilities do not disappear when their housing assignment changes.
An institution should not be able to effectively erase an existing disability accommodation simply because someone is moved from one location to another.
Why This Decision Matters Beyond California
Although Adom involves the California prison system, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning matters throughout the circuit.
The Ninth Circuit includes California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
Because Adom is a published Ninth Circuit decision, its interpretation of federal disability law is particularly important for federal district courts within the circuit.
For incarcerated people with disabilities—and advocates representing them—the case provides several important principles:
Meaningful access is the standard. The existence of a toilet, shower, program, service, or facility does not necessarily establish meaningful access for someone whose disability prevents them from using it effectively.
Medical necessity and ADA necessity are different questions. An institution cannot automatically defeat an ADA accommodation claim merely by characterizing the requested accommodation as medically unnecessary.
Identical treatment can itself be inadequate. Disability law sometimes requires treating a disabled person differently so that the person has genuinely equal access.
Partial accommodations may not satisfy the ADA. Providing towels, showers, laundry, or another alternative does not necessarily resolve liability if those measures fail to address the actual disability-related barrier.
Repeated notice matters. Grievances, accommodation requests, medical requests, letters, and other communications may become critical evidence that officials knew an accommodation was necessary and failed to adequately respond.
Dignity Is Part of Meaningful Access
There is another aspect of this decision that should not be overlooked.
Dignity.
Prison cases are frequently reduced to administrative terminology: medical necessity, institutional policy, security procedures, durable medical equipment, grievances, accommodations, and regulations.
But behind those terms are human beings.
Adom alleged that for months he was forced to soil himself, his bedding, and his wheelchair. He improvised diapers from garbage bags, tissues, plastic, and torn towels. He repeatedly asked for assistance.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that disability access cannot always be separated from the pain and humiliation a person must endure to obtain it.
That recognition matters.
Incarceration permits the government to restrict a person's liberty. It does not erase disability rights, and it does not eliminate the government's obligations under federal disability law.
An Important Victory—but the Case Is Not Over
It is important to be precise about what the Ninth Circuit decided.
The court did not find CDCR liable.
It did not award Adom damages.
Instead, it reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and held that sufficient factual disputes exist for his ADA claim to proceed.
A jury may now consider whether CDCR denied Adom meaningful access and whether the department acted with deliberate indifference.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed portions of Adom's Eighth Amendment claims in a separate memorandum disposition, reversing in part and affirming in part.
Still, for a lawsuit that began with a handwritten complaint filed by an incarcerated man without an attorney, the published appellate decision represents a significant development.
A Decision Worth Remembering
Adom v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation should become important reading for prisoners, disability-rights advocates, correctional administrators, attorneys, and anyone litigating ADA claims involving prisons and jails in the Ninth Circuit.
Its message is straightforward:
Access must be meaningful.
A prison cannot necessarily point to a technically available service when a person's disability makes that service practically inaccessible.
A medical determination does not automatically answer an ADA question.
And when officials know that a disabled person needs an accommodation, repeatedly deny meaningful relief, and instead provide inadequate “half-solutions,” a jury may be permitted to decide whether that conduct amounts to deliberate indifference.
Perhaps most importantly, Adom recognizes something that can easily disappear within institutional bureaucracy:
People with disabilities do not surrender their dignity when they enter a prison.
Adom v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. 24-4756 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (published opinion).
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